CVE-2026-31309: n/a n/a vulnerability

Advisory generated from the CVE record, CISA, Exploit Observer and VEDAS: what it is, whether it is exploited, who is affected, and how to fix and detect it.

Generated by VEDAS. Scores as of 2026-11-01 19:19 UTC. Rebuilt every few hours from cve-scores, CISA KEV and vedas-signatures. How this works and its limits.

What it is

Improper authorization in the /tequilapi/config/user endpoint of Mysterium Node from v1.21.1-rc0 before v1.36.0 allows an unauthenticated attacker to arbitrarily overwrite the node’s configuration and achieve a full node takeover via a crafted POST request.

Description quoted from the CVE record (assigned by mitre, published 2026-07-08).

Weakness: CWE-862 Missing Authorization

How it can be exploited

Exploitable over the network with low attack complexity needing no privileges and no user interaction. Impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability high. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CISA assessment (SSVC): CISA assesses that a public proof of concept exists. Automatable: yes. Technical impact: total.

Public exploit evidence (Exploit Observer)

Also known as: EUVD-2026-42495, GHSA-p7gf-g6r8-g65h

VEDAS cluster: VEDAS:CRITICALMAMMOTH

Exploit Observer links 6 pieces of public exploit code or detection modules that name this CVE or one of its aliases.

Exploit code and modules (6)

Code that names this CVE. A repository can be a working exploit, a scanner, a fake or malware; read it before running anything.

Vulnerability databases and vendor advisories (3)

Catalogue entries, not exploit evidence.

3 more references returned by Exploit Observer did not name this CVE or an alias, so they are left out.

VEDAS data as of 2026-11-01T17:12 UTC; fetched 2026-11-02.

Live scores

EPSS
0.006
low predicted chance of attack
VEDAS
0.987
strong exploit evidence
On CISA KEV
Not listed
Detection rule
Nuclei · Suricata

Who is affected

ProductAffectedNot affected
Not statedversion n/aNot stated

Version ranges exactly as the CVE record states them. “Before X” means X is the first fixed version.

How to fix it

No fixed version or vendor advisory is listed in the CVE record yet. Watch the vendor’s security page.

How to detect it

Nuclei template (active check)

Mysterium Node - Unauthenticated tequilapi Configuration Access

Improper authorization in the /tequilapi/config/user endpoint of Mysterium Node from v1.21.1-rc0 before v1.36.0 allows an unauthenticated attacker to read and arbitrarily overwrite the node’s configuration and achieve a full node takeover. The route “/config/user” was added to tequilapi’s UnprotectedRoutes, so the reverse proxy does not authenticate it: an anonymous GET /tequilapi/config/user returns the node’s user configuration payload ({“data”:{...}}) and an anonymous POST to the same path overwrites it. This template performs the non-destructive unauthenticated GET and confirms the vulnerability by matching the returned JSON configuration payload; fixed versions remove the route from the unprotected list and require authentication (HTTP 401).

Name and description quoted from the template, written by VEDAS.

The template sends 1 request (GET /tequilapi/config/user); it decides using status, word matchers. Severity in the template: critical. Marked as not yet verified against a live vulnerable target.

Run it against a host you own or are authorised to test:

bash
nuclei -u https://your-host -t CVE-2026-31309.yaml
Show the template (45 lines)
yaml
id: CVE-2026-31309

info:
  name: "Mysterium Node - Unauthenticated tequilapi Configuration Access"
  author: vedas-arpsyndicate
  severity: critical
  description: |
    Improper authorization in the /tequilapi/config/user endpoint of Mysterium Node from
    v1.21.1-rc0 before v1.36.0 allows an unauthenticated attacker to read and arbitrarily
    overwrite the node's configuration and achieve a full node takeover. The route
    "/config/user" was added to tequilapi's UnprotectedRoutes, so the reverse proxy does not
    authenticate it: an anonymous GET /tequilapi/config/user returns the node's user
    configuration payload ({"data":{...}}) and an anonymous POST to the same path overwrites it.
    This template performs the non-destructive unauthenticated GET and confirms the vulnerability
    by matching the returned JSON configuration payload; fixed versions remove the route from the
    unprotected list and require authentication (HTTP 401).
  reference:
    - https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2026-31309&match=exact
    - https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=mysterium&match=exact
  classification:
    cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
    cvss-score: 9.8
    cve-id: CVE-2026-31309
    cwe-id: CWE-862
  metadata:
    verified: false
  tags: cve,cve2026,mysterium,auth-bypass,unauth

http:
  - method: GET
    path:
      - "{{BaseURL}}/tequilapi/config/user"
    matchers-condition: and
    matchers:
      - type: word
        part: body
        words:
          - '"data"'
      - type: word
        part: header
        words:
          - "application/json"
      - type: status
        status:
          - 200

CVE-2026-31309.yaml on GitHub

Suricata rules (network detection)

1 rule that alert on traffic matching this exploit: VEDAS CVE-2026-31309 Mysterium Node Unauthenticated tequilapi config/user Access. Add them to your Suricata rule set and reload.

Show the rules
suricata
alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"VEDAS CVE-2026-31309 Mysterium Node Unauthenticated tequilapi config/user Access"; flow:established,to_server; http.uri; content:"/tequilapi/config/user"; fast_pattern; classtype:web-application-attack; reference:cve,CVE-2026-31309; reference:url,https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2026-31309&match=exact; reference:url,https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=mysterium&match=exact; sid:1096802; rev:1;)

CVE-2026-31309.rules on GitHub

References

Other references

Other databases

Where this comes from

This advisory is generated automatically by VEDAS from: CVE.org record, cve-scores (EPSS and VEDAS), Exploit Observer, vedas-signatures. Text in quotes is reproduced from the source; everything else is a fixed template filled with source fields. Nothing here is written by a language model. Check the vendor advisory before acting, and read how VEDAS and Exploit Observer work, and their limits.